

## RAMON LULL'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

Like most mediaeval philosophers, Ramon Lull<sup>1</sup> had no serious occasion to undertake an explicitly or an exclusively epistemological treatise. This is not to say however, that he was unaware of epistemological questions or that he failed to have a set of clearly thought-out answers for many of them. As a matter of fact, both his attention to and resolution of some rather basic epistemological issues permit us to assert that his was a consciously critical epistemological attitude, one which moreover, can be reasonably reconstructed from the various places in his numerous writings where he explicitly addressed points of epistemological consequence or significance. With as much practical recourse to the philosopher's words as may be possible in a brief communication, we shall attempt the reconstruction in the ensuing pages. Not too surprisingly, such a reconstruction will establish rather clearly that on basic epistemological issues there was an essential agreement between Lull's philosophical system and those of most of the other great mediaeval thinkers of his century.

Accordingly, it is well to note at the outset that Lull's epistemological posture was decidedly non-skeptical. Even a cursory acquaintance with his multi-faceted thought and writings suffices to show that, had the philosopher been asked about it he would have expressed little, if any, sympathy for the type of thought associated with universal or total skepticism, with its notion that men are not capable of arriving at any truth, speculative or practical, with a reasonably well-founded certainty.<sup>2</sup> It has to be said even that he would have rejected and opposed forcefully any of the seemingly

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<sup>1</sup> For an English biography see Edgar Allison Peers, *Ramon Lull - A Biography* (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1929). Lull's oldest biography was written five years before his death, probably right after he told it to friends in religious life. The original text has been critically edited as the *Vita coetanea* by Hermogenes Harada in *ROL* VIII (1980), 269-309.

<sup>2</sup> R. F. O'Neill, *The Theories of Knowledge*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1961, pp. 125-8.

limited kinds of skepticism which declare, or implicitly assert, that one or more of man's natural cognitive powers are in principle ineffective or defective so that consequently, man cannot come to know the truth naturally and with certainty. Had Lull been disposed or inclined towards skepticism, even a limited type of it, in a serious way; had he, in other words, thought that at least one of man's natural cognitive powers is totally ineffective or defective in principle, he would never have written books as *The Tree of Knowledge*<sup>3</sup> and *The Art of Finding Truth*,<sup>4</sup> except as complete literary fabrications and fictions. Nor would he have applied himself moreover, during the span of many years to the laborious task of writing no less than thirty books, many of them of a rather respectable size, with the exclusive intent of developing, explaining and revising the basic principles, methods and rules of an *Art* which he discovered, or invented, to facilitate the search and the discovery of truths in most, if not all, areas of human discourse.<sup>5</sup> In the prologue of an *Ars Amativa Boni*<sup>6</sup>—whose title indicates the author's concern in it not with truth and science directly but with the good and the art of loving it, *amantia* as he calls it—Lull declares in very clear terms that, although to succeed in the attainment of this goal requires much effort and discipline, yet to discover and to give birth to the truth is an enterprise naturally akin to and in perfect harmony with the nature of man's intellect.<sup>7</sup> The *raison d'être* and the chief purpose therefore, of man's distinctive and highest noetic power, the intellect or reason, is to enable us to understand and to know well. To be without the knowledge by means of the intellect that we could and should have is really indicative of a deviation of that power from what is a most natural and the chief purpose of its being.<sup>8</sup> A similar but less serious turning aside from a natural task occurs when a person chooses without reason to close his eyes or ears with the intent of neither seeing nor hearing things which

<sup>3</sup> Written in Catalan with the title *Arbre de ciència*, it may be read in *OE* I, 547-1046.

<sup>4</sup> *Ars inventiva veritatis* in Latin; it may be read in *MOG* V (1729), 1-210. Lull composed at least two other books with similar titles: *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* in *MOG* I, 433-481 = Int. vii and *Lectura Artis inventivae et Tabulae generalis* in *MOG* V, 359-715 = Int. v.

<sup>5</sup> The major moments in the evolution of the *Art* and its major revisions in the order of composition are marked by the a) *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*; b) *Ars demonstrativa*, *MOG* III, 93-204 = Int. iii; c) *Ars inventiva veritatis*; d) *Tabula generalis*, *MOG* V, 221-300 = Int. ii; e) *Ars generalis ultima*, ed. Francis Marçal (Palma-Majorca: Gabriel Guasp, 1645).

<sup>6</sup> This *Ars* may be read in *MOG* VI, 7-158 = Int. ii of the Mainz edition.

<sup>7</sup> "... Iste intellectus est liber in hoc quod intelligit, ... tamen est constrictus ... tamen talis constrictio non est contra suam naturam nec contra suam libertatem ... cum illi sit naturale parere veritatem". Lull, *Ars amativa boni* prol., in *MOG* VI, 8 = Int. ii, 2. Also: "Anima est, ut sit scientia, cum qua homo habeat cognitionem praesentium, praeteritorum et futurorum". Lull, *Liber de Anima rationali*, part 4, *MOG* VI, 444 = Int. vii, 30.

<sup>8</sup> "Finis intellectus est intelligere, et quando ignorat, ejus discursus est deviatu a fine, propter quem est". *Liber de anima rationali* part 3, *MOG* VI, 436 = Int. vii, 22.

he or she ought to hear.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, since the main business and end of the intellect is to bring us to the truth, then to see to it that with our understanding we acquire all appropriate and true knowledge within our reach is a serious duty, one incumbent upon us, as it were, because of our possession of a rational soul.<sup>10</sup>

A reflection of a definite non-skeptical frame of mind was Lull's conscious and solid assurance that each one of us is in possession of a number of truths, and this with at least an implicit and reasonably unshakable certainty. For instance, each one of us has the certainty of his or her existence beyond possible reasonable doubt. Without appealing to the indubitability of one's own existence, as had been done by St. Augustine against the skeptics nine centuries earlier and as would be done again by Descartes more than three centuries later, at the outset almost of his literary career Lull simply but forcefully recalled it as an occasion worthy of the greatest rejoicing before the creator, on account of the possession, awareness and certainty of our being.<sup>11</sup> By the actions that spring from them, as their immediate principle, even our sensory knowing powers reveal and manifest to us our existence in an undeniable manner.<sup>12</sup> How else may one account for and make sense of this acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and feeling? At a later occasion and in a later writing Lull noted emphatically that we are certain not only of our existence, but that we also have or can easily have a certain amount of positive and negative knowledge of what our soul is and is not, as well as of how we ought to live and act in order to lead the kind of moral existence suitable to rational creatures.<sup>13</sup>

Man's actual possession of truths is not limited to those which have to do with himself only. With likewise unshakable certainty and on the solid basis of personal experience, in which our sense powers have played and continue to play an indispensable and primary role, we also know that material and corporeal substances are in existence.<sup>14</sup> It is by means of the

<sup>9</sup> "... sicut homo agit contra finem ipsius videre, quando claudit oculos, et contra finem ipsius audire, quando obstruit aures". *Loc. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> "Anima est de fine suorum principiorum et potentiarum, quia... et propter hoc est obligata ad tractandum, quod illa principia veniant ad suum finem, scilicet... intellectus ad intelligendum". *Ibid.*, part 3, *MOG VI*, 439 = Int. vii, 25.

<sup>11</sup> "... nos, qui sumus certi, quod simus in esse". *Liber contemplationis in Deum*, c. 2:1, *MOG IX* (1740), 5.

<sup>12</sup> "Nam quinque sensus demonstrant esse, in quo sumus, quia oculis videmus, et auribus audimus, et naribus odoramur, et ore gustamus, et carne sentimus". *Loc. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> "... nam in hoc, quod homo habet cognitionem illius, de quo anima est, et illius, de quo anima non est, habet homo cognitionem animae, et potest habere doctrinam ad ordinandum animam ad bonos mores". *Liber de anima rationali*, part 3, *MOG VI*, 438 = Int. vii, 24.

<sup>14</sup> "Per experientiam scimus, quod sint corporales substantiae, quia ipsas sentimus per videre et tangere et per alios sensus: sicut lapis, qui est visibilis et tangibilis et sic de aliis substantiis". *Ibid.*, part 1, *MOG VI*, 417 = Int. vii, 3.

powers of sight and of touch that we actually experience much of the reality of many of the numerous bodily entities which collectively constitute what we rightly and ordinarily designate as the material and visible universe.

The repeated Lullian efforts in many works to outline, explain and develop demonstrations or rational proofs for the existence of the ontologically First and Supreme Being show clearly that the Majorcan philosopher did not consider the human mind's power to discover the truth as limited to the two following types simply: a) the truth of our existence and the knowledge of the content within our minds; b) and truths about what we may be able to experience directly with our bodily senses. Through the instrumentality of our rational and intellectual power of knowing we are further capable of establishing firmly truths which bear on an immaterial and spiritual realm generally and, more importantly and particularly, on the reality of an infinite and divine First Being.<sup>15</sup>

At the same time that Lull upheld against all types of skepticism the naturalness of knowledge and of truth for the human intellect, as well as its actual and possible possession, with certainty, of an amount of very significant knowledge and of a number of fundamental truths, he wisely avoided the twin errors of looking upon the human reason as a) a power exhaustive of all truth and b) a power creative of the truth within our minds. For him to avoid such epistemological errors was not difficult because he recognized first of all, the finite character of the human intellect<sup>16</sup> and secondly, because he realized well that in its knowledge of reality by means of species, or the similitudes of things known required by the embodied condition of the human intellect, our mind or reason cannot receive and judge within itself perfectly the objects it knows. The reason is that the human intellect in our present existence cannot, in and through knowledge, come close to exhausting the rich essential and non-essential entitative reality of the objects made present to it in knowledge.<sup>17</sup>

It is therefore clear that Lull was a conscious dogmatist, although admittedly he never described himself as one in those terms. Yet he explicitly acknowledged man's capacity, by reason of a natural endowment of our noetic powers, to arrive at the certain knowledge of basic and significant truths, as well as possibly of others. Moreover, what has heretofore

<sup>15</sup> For some idea of Lull's repeated efforts to prove God's existence in many of his writings see W. Artus, "Ramon Lull, The Metaphysician", *Antonianum* 56 (1981), p. 723, n. 23.

<sup>16</sup> "Quoniam nos sumus finiti ... non est rationabile, quod noster intellectus velit transire ultra terminum, in quo illum fecisti esse finitum et terminatum". *Liber contemplationis*, c. 5:4, *MOG* IX, 10.

<sup>17</sup> "... nec tamen ratio potest attingere tantum realitatis, quantum est in objecto: igitur isto modo deficit ratio, quia non potest tantum judicare de objecto, quantum objectum est". Lull, Ramon, *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, q. 78, *MOG* IV, 116 = Int. iii, 100.

been indicated also clearly shows that the Majorcan philosopher was a conscious epistemological realist.

He was rightly convinced first of all that neither ourselves nor the objects of everyday experiences are simply ideas within the wisdom and mind of the Supreme Being. Indeed, God has a perfect and eternal knowledge of each one of us and of all other things which are not the Divine Reality. But on the other hand, the idea of ourselves within the wisdom of God is not our real selves, entitatively speaking.<sup>18</sup> God's knowledge of each and all things which are other than Himself is one with and identical with His essence and being. Finite and contingent as is the reality of each one of us who is not the First being, we are not and can never be one with His infinite essence, nor even a part of it.<sup>19</sup> In a more explicit and direct manifestation of his epistemological realism, the Majorcan philosopher saw clearly that not only are the real things, of which we have experiential knowledge, extramental and separate from our minds in their entitative structure and reality, but also that through our knowledge, in those instances when it is directly experiential, we reach outside and beyond the content present within our minds. Consequently we know many of the objects of possible experience, directly in their actual reality and by their very presence.<sup>20</sup> We do indeed cognitively grasp our existence, with certainty as we have seen, as well as something of what we are and of our actions. But it is obvious that neither our existence nor our nature nor our actions are the mere contents of and within someone's consciousness, be it our own or someone else's. Moreover, when it is a question of the reality and existence of the many physical objects which collectively make up the material world, it is both a fact and a truth unequivocally asserted by Lull that we can and do know many bodily substances directly, through and in our manifold sensory-intellectual experiences of them.<sup>21</sup> Not once did he speak or write of man seeing, hearing or touching sensations or simply the ideas of colors, sounds and other physical features possibly possessed by possibly existing corporeal substances of the world. On the contrary very

<sup>18</sup> "Anima Martini, in quantum est idea, est Deus ... et in quantum illa idea est differens ab anima Martini, anima non est de essentia ideae, sed est de suis propriis principiis". *Liber de anima rationali*, part 3, *MOG* VI, 438 = Int. vii, 24.

<sup>19</sup> See W. Artus, "La creación, señal de la filosofía luliana", *EL* 17 (1973), 132-163, pp. 149, 156-57.

<sup>20</sup> "Per experientiam scimus, quod sint corporales substantias, quia ipsas sentimus per videre et tangere et per alios sensus..." *Liber de anima rationali*, part 1, *MOG* VI, 417 = Int. vii, 3. Also: "Anima est substantia, quae indiget organo, cum quo attingat scientiam objectorum corporalium; sicut ad attingendum colorem, ad quem indiget oculis et potentia sentiendi..." *Ibid.*, part 2, *MOG* VI, 425 = Int. vii, 11.

<sup>21</sup> "Per experientiam scimus, quod sint corporales substantias, quia ipsas sentimus per videre et tangere et per alios sensus..." *Ibid.*, part 1, *MOG* VI, 417 = Int. vii, 3.

clearly he wrote to the effect that sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch are powers by means of which colors, sounds, flavors, etc. are seized and attained by us directly and in the first instance.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, it is precisely in order to insure the direct experiential knowledge of at least some of the properties and reality of the physical substances of the world that the human soul is substantially united with, and has a need of, a body with its many organs, such as eyes for seeing colors, ears to hear sounds, etc.<sup>23</sup>

An essential element detectable in Lull's realism was his clear awareness and grasp of the distinction between on the one hand, the order of being and on the other, the order of knowledge, although obviously there is a relation between them. On at least one occasion he speaks of the "modus essendi" and of the "modus intelligendi", with the latter clearly in the subsidiary position.<sup>24</sup> Practically at the start of his writing career, he made it clear that he was more than sufficiently aware that we may state, correctly and meaningfully, that things are or exist a) in reality and b) as well as in knowledge. Thinking of things which are entitatively other than God, he expressed himself in these terms: "We know that the being of creatures is given in three distinct modes: first, one wherein creatures exist within God's wisdom; the second one wherein they are formally in the soul, in the intellect which knows them, that is; the third one wherein they are in themselves".<sup>25</sup> Doubtlessly the being possessed by things through or in their being within someone's soul, i.e. within the intellect or other knowing powers by means of which they are seized in knowledge, is profoundly different and diverse from the entitative being which is theirs insofar as they exist separately in themselves, i.e. extramentally or, in a phrase utilized by Lull, "in re, extra vocem et etiam extra animam."<sup>26</sup> The distinction in question more than justifies the various types of science

<sup>22</sup> "Visus est illa potentia, quae primo attingit colorem... Auditus est illa potentia, quae sentit sonum..." Lull, *Liber proverbiorum*, part 3, cc. 57-61, in *MOG* VI, pp. 395-6 = Int. vi, 113-114.

<sup>23</sup> "Anima est substantia, quae indiget organo, cum quo attingat scientiam objectorum corporalem." *Liber de anima rationali*, part 2, *MOG* VI, 425 = Int. vii, 11.

<sup>24</sup> "Cum sit differentia inter modum essendi rei et modum eam intelligendi, considerandum est, quare procedit medium conclusionis... Si autem accadat inevitabilis contrarietas inter illos (quae patet in punctis transcendentibus) concludendum est necessario per modum essendi..." Lull, Ramon, *Ars inventiva veritatis*, d. 2, reg. 2, in *MOG* V, 38. Cp. "Per realitatem intendimus considerare entitatem rei consideratae; per rationem intendimus considerare similitudinem et conceptum, quem facit anima rationalis, tunc, quando considerat realitatem rerum per illarum similitudines". Lull, *Ars amativa*, d. 2, reg. 5, *MOG* VI, 21 = Int. ii, 15.

<sup>25</sup> "Notum est, quod esse creaturarum sit in tribus modis: unus est, quod omnes creaturae sint in sapientia Dei; alter est, quod sint formaliter in anima, hoc est, in intellectu, qui illas intelligit; tertius est, quod sint in se ipsis". Lull, *Liber mirandarum demonstrationum*, I, c. 12, in *MOG* II 182 = Int. v, 6.

<sup>26</sup> Lull, *Liber de multiplicatione, quae fit in essentia Dei, per divinam trinitatem*, *ROL* II, 139.



that we have. Many bodies of scientific knowledge, with metaphysics at the head, investigate and provide us with information about the entities and things "quae sunt extra animam".<sup>27</sup> We also have the disciplines we speak of collectively as logic. In them we investigate objects or things considered only "secundum esse, quod habent in anima".<sup>28</sup> Yet, when all is said and done, it cannot be gainsaid that a vast difference obtains between the real or extramental way of being which belongs to all the entities which exist *realiter* in themselves and the intentional or mental way of being, which may also belong to the same things and others by the fact that they are known. Unlike the later empiricist and idealist thinker, Berkeley, who declared the *esse* and *percipi* of material bodies identical, Lull never confused the *modus essendi rei* and the *modus intelligendi*. In addition he noted clearly that the entitative being of real things is and shall always remain the correct basis for the speculative mode of knowing, since it is the function of the latter to enable knowers to assimilate within themselves, through knowledge, the structure and character of what is real, as accurately and perfectly as humanly possible.<sup>29</sup> Whereas the *modus essendi rei* is actually constituted and brought about by interior entitative principles, substantial and accidental within each thing, the *modus intelligendi* in most cases results from, or better is one with, the species or similitudes of things abstracted and drawn from the experienced things in the world.<sup>30</sup> It is through those species, now united with our various knowing powers, that the real things become intentionally present to our senses and imagination first and then, to our intellective power.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>27</sup> "Metaphysica enim considerat res, quae sunt extra animam, prout conveniunt in ratione entis". *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 55 = Int. ii, 1.

<sup>28</sup> "Logica autem considerat res secundum esse, quod habent in anima, quia tractat de quibusdam intentionibus, quae consequuntur esse rerum intelligibilium..." *Loc. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> "Unde cum *modus intelligendi* ad *modum essendi rei* dirigatur, quantum potest, tanquam ad terminum ad quem, ut ipse *modus essendi* per *modum intelligendi* attingatur, formanda est major proportio et concordantia inter utrumque modum, et contrarietas inter eos (ut melius poterit) evitanda. Si autem accidat inevitabilis contrarietas... concludendum est necessario per *modum essendi*". *Ars inventiva*, d. 2, reg. 2, *MOG* V, 38.

<sup>30</sup> "Est autem *modus essendi rei* per sua propria principia et in suis necessariis principiis substantialibus et accidentalibus, sine quibus ipsa res esse non potest, seu per quae et de quibus ipsa res ad perfectum esse deducta est... *Modus vero intelligendi* sunt ipsae similitudines *modi essendi* per sensum et imaginationem, aut quandoque sine sensu et imaginatione ab intellectu abstractae". *Loc. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> "Anima habet objecta ad extra in objectis ad intra". *Liber de anima rationali* *MOG* VI, 433 = Int. vii, 19. "Nullum objectum, quod non est conjunctum cum anima, potest esse intra animam realiter: sicut asinus, qui non est intra animam, quae intelligit asinum; sed similitudo illius asini est species, quam intellectus intelligit, in qua ita intelligit asinum..." *Ibid.*, part 8, *MOG* VI, 462 = Int. vii, 48. "Anima habet in imaginativa similitudines vel species secundariorum objectorum... et ponit ejus similitudinem ad intra in intelligere, quando in abstracto intelligit speciem plantae vel..." *Ibid.*, part 2, *MOG* VI, 432 = Int. vii, 18 "... in via anima nunquam potest intelligere remotum intelligibile sine vel sensuali vel intellectu phantasmate..." *Quaestiones per Artem*, q. 78, *MOG* IV, 107 = Int. iii, 91.

Obviously therefore, the thirteenth century Majorcan Lull was a realist, one who unabashedly but rationally affirmed the extramental reality, not exclusively of course, of the physical things of the world, for they are ontologically other than and distinct from a) our awareness of them and b) the knowing powers by means of which we are aware of them. The material or physical objects of our everyday experience and an innumerable quantity of others are *entia realia*. As such, and particularly in the being which they possess entitatively, they are profoundly distinct from all *entia phantastica*<sup>32</sup> which, in their turn as such, have no more than what is an *esse in anima, hoc est in intellectu*. A more significant element of the Lullian epistemological realism is that it correctly acknowledged that in most instances when we execute acts of knowledge, specifically those which actively involve our senses, we are in some way and with certainty, receiving information about the real things of the world. But as students of modern philosophy know well today, a sound and complete realism must go further. Descartes and Locke accepted the extramental existence of the world of reality, explicitly that of the physical or material universe. Both thinkers also thought that the physical and extended substances of the world are distinct and entitatively separate from our minds, as well as from the thoughts or ideas of them. They also acknowledged that through at least some of the thoughts or ideas which we obviously seem to have of the things in the world we are, within limits, correctly informed about the things they agreed exist extramentally. Nevertheless both of them again, as well as their recent followers and successors, declare, rather unequivocally, that the immediate and direct object of our knowing powers, and consequently of knowledge itself, is our thoughts or ideas, and not the things themselves which make up the world. Appropriately as a result, Descartes' and Locke's realism has been characterized a "Representative Realism" since, according to both, what men know directly and immediately is the representations of things. This is what our ideas are, at least many of those that seem to make us aware of the corporeal substances in the world, as well as of their properties.<sup>33</sup>

Very different is the immediate realism<sup>34</sup> explicitly, or at least implicitly, present in the thought of most mediaeval philosophers. For them and for Lull who was one of them, the immediate object of particularly

<sup>32</sup> "Ens reale est illud, a quo humanus intellectus abstrahit similitudines... Istud ens, fili, dicitur reale, quia existit in seipso; et quamvis humanus intellectus non esset, ipsum remaneret in se ipso hoc, quod est... Ens phantasticum est illud, quod humanus intellectus multiplicat et componit de speciebus, in quibus attingit veritatem entium. Hoc ens, fili, non esset, nisi humanus intellectus esset hoc, quod est". Lull, *Arbor philosophiae desideratae*, d. I, part 1, in *MOG*, VI, 248 = Int. v, 8.

<sup>33</sup> O'Neill, *op cit.*, p. 191. Also John Pfeifer, *The Mystery of Knowledge*, (Albany: Magi Books, 1964), pp. 14-15.

<sup>34</sup> For a brief account of this realism in St. Thomas Aquinas see Pfeifer, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-33.



our experiential sensory intellectual knowledge is given in reality itself, in the individual physical beings or things of the world in which we live, not in the thoughts or ideas which we may and do often have of them, within our minds. The real objects or things themselves, not the ideas in which and by which they become present to us within our knowing powers, are the direct object of our knowledge. What men in most cases attend to, what they deal with, when they perform acts of knowledge, particularly and certainly the experiential ones, are the *entia realia* which have existence *extra animam*. This of course is not the case in the instances in which minds construct *entia rationis*, mental beings and constructs to which Lull gave the designation "*entia phantastica*". On the numerous occasions when we actually experience and know directly the real objects or entities in the physical world, our cognitive powers, both sensory and intellectual ones, receive within themselves, intentionally or spiritually, some of the physical characteristics and something of the intelligible entitative structure which are really present in the things we perceive and understand. By way of the cognitional acts of the various external senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch we actually seize, intentionally of course, the colors, sounds, flavors, shapes and other physical features of objects in the world which are visible, audible, tangible, etc.<sup>35</sup> Far from finding itself locked in total isolation within itself, and without any contact with what is outside of itself in the rest of the world of reality, our soul by reason of its sensory noetic powers is in a very real sense actively passive and receptive of exterior physical objects when, with those powers, it actively and directly perceives their colors, sounds, shapes and other physical properties.<sup>36</sup> Those accidental features of the exterior things are actively received by the knower from outside itself,<sup>37</sup> immaterially and intentionally, not entitatively of course. Obviously, a power such as sight, with the bodily organ it informs, cannot actually seize or see a color or a shape which is not out there in an object before it. Nor can one actually hear sounds and noises which have neither occurred nor been produced by some object in the world.<sup>38</sup> In our sensory cognitive experiences there is, therefore, an

<sup>35</sup> "... in homine potentiam sensitivam, per quam homo habet quinque sensus sensuales, hoc est, auditum, visum... nam per auditum audit loquelas et voces... per visum habet cognitionem de diversitatibus formarum et colorum... per tactum habet cognitionem de rebus tangibilibus..." *Liber contemplationis*, c. 41:1, *MOG* IX, 86.

<sup>36</sup> "Anima habet passiones cum objectis extrinsecis; sicut per colorem, vel per sonum, vel per pulchritudinem foeminae, vel per bonum saporem vini et pomi". *Liber de anima rationali*, Part 10, *MOG* VI, 473 = Int. vii, 59.

<sup>37</sup> "Cristallum positum supra subjectum coloratum accipit similitudinem a colore subjecti... idem sequitur de quinque corporalibus sensibus; veluti oculi, qui realiter accipiunt figuras a substantiis, et similitudines, quas speculum accipit a rebus ab extra". Lull, *Ars amativa*, d. 2, reg. 5, *MOG* VI, 21 = Int. ii, 15.

<sup>38</sup> "... nam sicut oculi non possunt videre sine colore, nec aures audire sine sono..." *Liber de anima rationali*, Part 7, *MOG* VI, 457 = Int. vii, 43.

authentic, though immaterial and intentional, reception of one or more of the sensible accidents really possessed by the objects which our senses perceive. Of course neither the physical objects themselves nor their real properties can enter and be received within the soul, or its powers, in their entitative existence.<sup>39</sup> On that account it is necessary to say that known objects become present to our minds through or in some intentional similitudes of the species, or forms, actually present in the objects.<sup>40</sup> By reason of their ontological or entitative reality, which is physical also in the case of the material and sensible things of the world, the real things a knower knows must remain separate from, and outside, the knowing power whereby he knows them. The things themselves cannot enter into the power or the soul *realiter*. Nevertheless, the knower takes them in through or by means of their intentional similitudes or species, wherein and whereby they can and do become present to the knower as knower.<sup>41</sup> Intentionally and immaterially therefore, the soul of a knower has within itself the objects which he knows, although they remain other than, and outside of, itself *realiter*. By means of and in species abstracted from the objects themselves, these are placed finally within the power of the intellect known as the possible intellect, wherein at last the potentially intelligible objects of the material world are actually known and understood, in some measure at least.<sup>42</sup>

Our last statement and a few others before it reflect an understanding of human knowledge which human experience bears out, namely that man's knowledge is not simply a matter of sensations, no matter how redefined. In contrast to the incipient and imperfect knowledge rightly associated with brute animals, human knowledge is more perfectly and more completely achieved through understanding or intellectual knowledge. Even our contact with the physical entities found *extra animam et etiam extra vocem* extends past and beyond physical accidental characteristics to their interior entitative essence and to other intelligible features. All

<sup>39</sup> "Nullum objectum, quod non est conjunctum cum anima, potest esse intra animam realiter: sicut asinus, qui non est intra animam, quae intelligit asinum; sed similitudo illius asini..." *Ibid.*, part 8, *MOG* VI 462 = Int. vii, 48.

<sup>40</sup> "... sed similitudo illius asini est species, quam intellectus intelligit, in qua ita intelligit asinum, sicut homo qui videt suam faciem in speculo; et illam speciem comprehendit intellectus..." *Loc. cit.*

<sup>41</sup> "Anima est substantia spiritualis, quae per speciem attingit objecta quae accipit; sicut mater, quae memorat filium quem non videt..." *Ibid.*, part 2, *MOG* VI, 425 = Int. vii, 11. "Anima habet in se ipsa objecta, quae, capit, sicut Martinus, qui intelligit suum filium vel alium absentem a sensu; et ideo potentiae non exeunt extra substantiam, quando capiunt objecta, sed de substantiis ad extra colligunt illa, et ponunt illa ad intra, capiendo de substantiis ab extra earum similitudines, et convertendo illas in substantias ad intra". *Ibid.*, part 2, *MOG* VI, 428 = Int. vii, 14.

<sup>42</sup> "Anima etiam habet in se ipsa partes activas et passivas: ...habet potentias passivas, in quantum in illis potest ponere impressiones et similitudines aliarum substantiarum... et ille intellectus intelligibilis est possibilis". *Loc. cit.*

extramentally existing real things are fundamentally intelligible<sup>43</sup> precisely because they are possessed of being and existence. In principle therefore, all of them can actually be understood and known intellectually, at least to some extent, by entities possessed of an intellect, such as men are. This at least is the understanding of man's cognitional situation explicitly held by Lull and present in his writings. With what has previously been indicated, it makes it quite clear that, like most of his contemporary philosophical colleagues, Lull merits to be identified as a moderate intellectual realist.<sup>44</sup> According to him, as for most of them, our cognitive contact with the world of our everyday experience is not achieved or realized by means simply of our senses, indispensable as these are for both our initial and our direct knowledge of the sensible things of the world. Man has been endowed with an intellect and a reasoning power which permit him to arrive at a knowledge of the truth about the physical realities of the world in its full sense of the word, as well as to some knowledge about what is other than the material universe. Man's intellect however, is not a power which is either infallible or all-knowing. Nor is it ordinarily capable of coming by much of its acquired knowledge, at least initially, except it be served or ministered faithfully and constantly by the humbler sensory cognitive powers and by our imagination.<sup>45</sup> Lull understood clearly that man's complete cognitive nature comprises, in addition to the intellect, the powers of external sensation and of the imagination which are also present in animals. But he did not fail to see with undiluted clarity that what distinguishes man specifically from all the brute animals is the possession of rational powers, one of the most important ones being the power of the intellect or the human reason. This intellectual and rational cognitive power is not just a little different and higher in degree than the sensory powers and the imagination. Rather it is specifically distinct and superior because it is truly spiritual. Of the various noetic powers possessed by humans it is the highest and the noblest.<sup>46</sup> For whereas with the senses and the imagi-

<sup>43</sup> "... et extra sunt multae intelligibilitates, quae non sunt de essentia intellectus; sicut intelligibilitas ignis et sui caloris, plantae et sui coloris, equi et sui videre, et sic de aliis intelligibilitatibus similibus istis; et omnes istae intelligibilitates sunt passionis dispositae ad esse passivae sub intellectivo intrinseco; et quia sunt de uno genere intelligibilitatis cum intelligibilitate intrinseca..." *Ibid.*, part 10, *MOG* VI, 471 = *Int.* vii, 57.

<sup>44</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas is so described. See Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, tr. E. I. Watkins (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962), pp. 130-31.

<sup>45</sup> "In quantum anima non potest habere suas operationes ad intra sine multiplicatione specierum ad extra conuenit, quod extra habeat passionem, quas imprimat intra: sicut passionem per videre vel per alium sensum impressam in imaginatione, et de imaginatione in intelligibilitate ad intra, in qua intellectuum intelligit..." *Liber de anima rationali*, part 9, *MOG* VI, 467 = *Int.* vii.

<sup>46</sup> "... quia nobilitasti potentiam rationativam super omnes alias potentias in hoc, quod eam facias esse dominam ipsarum, cum facias eam dominam imaginativae, quae est domina sensitivae". *Liber contemplationis*, c. 43, n. 4, *MOG* IX, 91.

nation men seize and know the size, shapes, colors, sounds and other physical properties of the objects around them, with the intellect they can apprehend what belongs to their inner authentic being, as well as other intelligible features which may belong to them and other things. By means of their understanding men can really determine and know whether things are or are not. By means of it they can also grasp something of what they are and of their causes.<sup>47</sup> These and other intelligible factors can be known by man, and by him alone on this earth, because he has been endowed with the power of the intellect.

In order to complete the epistemological picture of Lull as a moderate intellectual realist, it only needs to be added that he recognized that, although man has a variety of knowing powers which fundamentally are neither the body nor its organs, the human existent and person is not his soul alone.<sup>48</sup> For that reason and on that account one must acknowledge that human beings have an indispensable need, at least in their present existence, of the sensory knowing powers with their bodily organs, even for the acquisition and development of their distinctively rational or intellectual knowledge.<sup>49</sup> It is true that men carry out the actual acts of understanding properly with their intellects alone. But yet they cannot naturally and normally exercise those acts unless the senses first provide the intellect, via the imagination, with the species of corporeal substances which, really present, acted originally on the senses.<sup>50</sup> Since the intentional species received by the senses and passed on to the imagination are sensible in their representative character, the intellect has to immaterialize and spiritualize them before it can receive them.<sup>51</sup> It accomplished this by an abstraction which it effects on the species presented to it by and within

<sup>47</sup> "...ordinasti, quod potentia rationativa figuret et inquirat rem: utrum sit, vel non sit in esse; et, si inveniatur, quod sit in esse, inquirat causam, quare est, et, si inveniatur, quod res non sit in esse, inquirat causam, quare non est; et si inveniatur, quod res sit in esse, inquirat, quid sit et qualis sit..." *Ibid.*, c. 43:9, *MOG IX*, 92.

<sup>48</sup> "Homo est substantia constituta ex anima rationali et corpore elementato, vegetato, sensato et imaginato... et quando contingit, quod homo non sit homo, ipse desinit esse propter separationem suarum partium... sic homo perseverat esse homo per compositionem et propinquitatem suarum partium". *Liber de homine*, part 3, *MOG VI*, 484 = Int. viii, 10.

<sup>49</sup> "...est differentia inter angelum et animam... secundum modum agentiae; ... anima accipit species extrinsecas per sensum, et de sensu transmittit illas in imaginationem, et de imaginatione ponit illas in se ipsa, quae sunt similitudines substantiarum corporalium; et quando illas accipit in se ipsa, facit illas spirituales... denudatas corporalitate". *Liber de anima rationali*, *MOG VI*, 465-6 = Int. vii, 51-2. Read also: "...sicut speculum sensuale repraesentat, et demonstrat figuras sibi praesentes, ita res sensuales sunt scala et demonstratio, per quem homo ascendit ad percipiendum res intellectuales". *Liber contemplationis*, c. 169:1, *MOG IX*, 392.

<sup>50</sup> See note 45 above.

<sup>51</sup> "... et de imaginatione ponit illas in se ipsa, quae sunt similitudines substantiarum corporalium; et quando illas accipit in se ipsa, facit illas spirituales, et transmutat illas de imaginalitate in spiritualitatem, denudatas corporalitate". *Liber de anima rationali*, part 9, *MOG VI*, 466 = Int. vii, 52.

the imagination. The result is that the intelligible entitative structure and other intelligible features, potentially intelligible in the sensible species within the imagination, are rendered actually intelligible and become actually understood by and within the intellect.

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